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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Chubais retires…or not quite yet 
It seems that rumors of Anatoli Chubais' retirement were a bit premature.  
Chubais often had mentioned that the 1 July completion date for the 
disaggregation of RAO/UES (Russia's Unified Electrical System corporation) also 
would mark the date of his retirement.  However, on just that day, Chubais met 
with President Medvedev and reportedly was offered a position as chairman of 
the oversight board of Russian Nanotechnologies.  The board currently is headed 
by Leonid Melamed, who previously served as a senior aide to Chubais.  After so 
many strenuous years in the inner circles of Kremlin power, retirement might 
have seemed an attractive idea to Chubais; the nanotechnologies industry, 
already budgeted to receive 130 billion rubles in state investments (a figure likely 
to increase), also could hold significant appeal.  There has been no report of 
Chubais' decision as yet.  (1) 
 
The reorganization and eventual dismantling of RAO/UES marked the end to a 
long-running battle for Chubais, who has found a unique way to celebrate the 
accomplishment.  He will auction off the office chair, from which he led 
RAO/UES, with proceeds to benefit a children's charity in the Kaluga Region.  
Chubais pointed out the significance of his donation: "I am still sitting in it and 
there have been attempts to knock it [out] from under me, but I fought back as 
best I could."  (2) 
 
Speaking of attempts to knock out Chubais, three suspects on trial in the 
attempted assassination of Chubais were acquitted by a Moscow court last 
month, after a 5 June not guilty verdict from the jury.  In 2005, Chubais came 
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under attack in his car by a roadside explosion and armed individuals. Chubais 
was not injured in the attack.  Commenting on the verdict, Chubais said, "I 
consider it a mistake."  (3) 
 
At least one of the suspects, a reported member of GRU, wants his old job back.  
Vladimir Kvachkov, who previously worked at the Center of Military Strategic 
Studies of the General Staff, announced, "I'm acquitted. There is nothing 
anymore to keep me from getting my job back." "Besides, I'm nearly finished with 
my thesis on theory of special operations..." (4) 
 
The quiet war 
In an address prior to the presidential election, successor candidate Dmitri 
Medvedev had very pointed remarks about state officials who abused their office: 
"We need to create a system in which stealing from the state is dangerous and 
unprofitable.  … [W]e can't just put our snout in the trough and believe that we 
have made a success of our life. … Leave the public sector and go to work in the 
private sector." (5)  As president, Medvedev seems poised to launch a campaign 
both to entice some officials into leaving state service voluntarily, while 
simultaneously pursuing targeted corruption investigations aggressively – all of 
which is stoking an already factious apparat.  
 
The contentious nature of the Putin-Medvedev succession laid bare certain 
factional splits and rivalries within the elite, notably among the siloviki.   While the 
Medvedev presidency still is getting its legs underneath it, the apparat divisions 
appear to be widening as skirmishes break out over new rules for state officials, 
and, perhaps more importantly, control of the main corruption investigations 
committee. 
 
On 2 July, Arkadi Dvorkovich, Medvedev's economic adviser, announced that 
state officials who occupy spots on the boards of directors of Russia's state-
owned companies soon would be removed and replaced with "independent 
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directors." (6)  The separation of officials from corporate boards will move in two 
phases: first, the wholly state-owned companies, followed by state-controlled 
companies.  This disentanglement of state officials from their corporate 
connections is part of a larger anti-corruption drive being drawn up by the 
president's anti-corruption council, headed by Kremlin Chief of Staff Sergei 
Naryshkin.  Legislation to support the council's program is expected in October, 
or at least by the end of the year. (7) 
 
Despite Medvedev's apparent interest in pursuing corruption in this manner, Vice 
Prime Minister Igor Sechin, head of the so-called "losing clan" during the 
succession battle, as well as Chairman of the Board of Rosneft, urged caution 
and circumspection in implementing the president's initiative:  "Work to replace 
government officials with independent directors will proceed, but it should be 
done carefully, without reducing capitalization."  (8) 
 
According to Sechin, Russian companies already have "independent" directors, 
and "we can think" about augmenting their number.  He clearly suggests an 
oversight role in any personnel changes.  "If we see such bright personalities for 
Rosneft, we will agree with their appointment to the Board of Directors, while 
observing the procedure."  (9) 
 
While it seems clear that Sechin hoped to signal apparat-corporate stability in his 
attempts to mitigate, if not stymie, the effects of this Kremlin plan, President 
Medvedev appears unlikely to abandon such a high-profile element of his anti-
corruption campaign.  In a recent meeting with First Deputy Prime Minister Igor 
Shuvalov, Medvedev asked for a report on his "instructions to the government … 
about the board of directors of state-run companies."  In response, Shuvalov 
described the contours of a plan that provides wide latitude in the definition of 
"independent."  "In line with your instructions, we saw to it that joint-stock 
companies should be headed by a government member, or high-ranking official 
of the President's Executive Office; we made sure that all other directors were 
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either professionals or work under contract with the Russian government or 
represent some public organizations.  Above all, we wanted to make sure that 
these officials were independent, that they would care for their joint-stock 
companies, and that there would be no conflict of interest, that they would not be 
affiliated with competing businesses.  A list of such individuals has been 
compiled and approved by the government cabinet."  (10, Emphasis added)  
Clearly, some work has to be done to reconcile the purpose of this reform with 
the process set out to achieve it. 
 
Perhaps the most bitter battle, and one that has been brewing for months, 
concerns control of the anti-corruption drive through chairmanship of the 
Investigations Committee.  The current besieged chairman, Aleksandr Bastrykin, 
has thrown a deputy overboard in the face of serious criticism over a major, 
provocative investigation and been forced to abandon its prosecution.  (For more 
on the Storchak and Bulbov cases and their ramifications, please see The ISCIP 
Analyst, Vol. XIV, No.12, 24 Apr 08.)  Now, Bastrykin has been called to resign 
after media reports appeared, claiming that he has significant business interests 
in the Czech Republic.  Procurator-General Yuri Chaika at least offered to inquire 
about the report, "I will talk with Bastrykin to clarify some points … If there are 
grounds, we will initiate [an inquiry]."   (11) 
 
For his part, Bastrykin has denied the allegations:  "I officially state that neither I 
nor members of my family were ever involved in any business activity, either in 
Russia or abroad." (12) 
 
Aleksandr Khinshtein, Duma deputy for One Russia and author of the comments 
in the Moskovskii komsomolets article that started this brouhaha stands by his 
allegations and suggests that Bastrykin either sue him for libel or resign. (13)  
While it should be fairly easy to trace Bastrykin's business dealings, some 
individuals, nonetheless, seem to have put a great deal of effort into discrediting 
him. 
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As analysts search for signals that suggest who really is ruling Russia in the 
current diarchical structure, the winners and losers in the side combat over 
control and scope of any corruption investigations or legislation may provide a 
clear picture of the relative status of the president, prime minister, or, at the very 
least, their champions and allies. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Vedomosti, 3 Jul 08; Russian Business Monitor, 4 Jul 08 via Lexis-Nexis 
Academic. 
(2) ITAR-TASS, 713 pm EST, 30 Jun 08 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(3) Gazeta, #110, 17 Jun 08; Russian Press Digest via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(4) Komsomolskaya Pravda, 17 Jun 08, p. 4; What the Papers Say via Lexis-
Nexis Academic. 
(5) "Interview with Itogi Magazine," 18 Feb 08; www.medvedev2008.ru via 
Johnson's Russia List (JRL), 27 Feb 08, 2008-#42. 
(6) "Independent execs to replace govt. officials," RIA-Novosti, 2 Jul 08 via Lexis-
Nexis Academic. 
(7) "Medvedev expects new anti-corruption law to be passed this year," RIA-
Novosti, 2 Jul 08 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(8) ITAR-TASS, 935 PM EST, 9 Jul 08 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(9) Ibid. 
(10) Beginning of a working meeting with First Deputy Prime Minister Igor 
Shuvalov, 11 Jul 08, President of Russia Official web portal via www.kremlin.ru. 
(11) Interfax, 3 Jul 08 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(12) Argumenty I Fakty, 9 Jul 08 via BBC Monitoring Library via 
http://bbcmonitoringlibrary.com. 
(13) "Russian MP challenges investigations chief to sue him over newspaper 
article," BBC Monitoring Library, 9 Jul 09 via http://bbcmonitoringlibrary.com (no 
primary source given). 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Rose Monacelli 
 
Have a baby, win a refrigerator? 
The world’s population is aging, but in few countries is it of more concern than in 
Russia, where the population has fallen by six million persons in the last 15 
years. (1)  In 2006, President Vladimir Putin referred to the issue of population 
decline as “Russia’s most acute problem today.” (2)  A United Nations-sponsored 
study released in April found that the issue has grown even more serious over 
the past two years.  This year, Russia’s current population of 142 million is 
expected to decrease by .5%, or roughly 667,000 persons, falling to between 
125-135 million by 2025, and as low as 100 million by 2050. (3) In economic 
terms, the country’s workforce will lose eight million workers by 2015 and up to 
19 million by 2025, seriously jeopardizing Russia’s slowly growing status as a 
global economic power. (4) 
 
Population change is based on three factors: birth rate, death rate, and 
immigration.  In order to maintain the current population level, the average 
Russian woman would have to have 2.2 children.  The current figure stands at 
1.3 children. (5) In 2007, Putin attempted to resolve this situation by declaring 
that 2008 would be the “Year of the Family” and launching a campaign designed 
to encourage marriage and childbirth.  This announcement followed the official 
designation of September 12 as national “Family Contact Day,” an annual 
celebration on which Russian couples are encouraged to say home from work in 
order to enjoy “marital closeness” in the hopes of producing children exactly nine 
months later on “Russia Day,” June 12. (6) Currently, 65% of Russian families 
have one child, and of those, only one-third want a second, (7) despite Prime 
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Minister Putin’s recent decision to award women 250,000 rubles (approximately 
$11,000) for having a second child. (8) 
 
However, these “solutions” to the population crisis fail to take into account the 
issue’s roots – Russia’s lack of basic infrastructure, jobs and economic stability. 
Efforts to improve the quality of life would go a long way towards making couples 
secure enough to consider expanding their families.  Incentive programs actually 
may make the situation worse, as in Ulyanovsk, where “Family Contact Day” 
already had been celebrated unofficially since 2005. (9) Governor Sergei 
Morozov introduced the holiday as a “sex day” (10) to combat his region’s 
discouraging two-to-one death-to-birth ratio, offering prizes to couples that could 
“give birth to a patriot on Russia day.” In 2007, the grand prize, a new sport utility 
vehicle, went to the only family to have given birth to a fourth child, but every 
woman who gave birth on June 12 received $300. (11) 
 
On one hand, the program was a success, as 87 children were born in Ulyanovsk 
last year on June 12.  On the other, the popularity of this type of program 
illuminates larger issues at work in the region that previously had been best 
known as part of Russia’s “Red Belt.” Located to the west of the Volga River, the 
“Red Belt” is an area comprised mainly of farming communities, which have seen 
none of the benefits of the past decade’s economic reforms enjoyed by Russia’s 
larger cities.  It is an area where few can afford the most basic necessities, which 
may explain why so many women appeared eager to give birth for the 
opportunity to win cash prizes or appliances, without thinking of the long-term 
implications of having a child for profit. (12) 
 
Although most women interviewed on or after June 12 have refuted any 
suggestion that they had planned to give birth on June 12, it appears that labor 
was induced artificially on such a wide scale that some of the region’s maternity 
wards, which had been filled to capacity that day, may have run out of labor-
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inducing drugs.  A remarkable number of cesarean sections were performed, as 
well. (13) 
 
The newest initiative designed to increase Russia’s population is another 
government-sponsored holiday, the recently introduced “Day of Family, Love, 
and Fidelity,” celebrated annually on July 8.  The holiday, sponsored by Russia’s 
new First Lady Svetlana Medvedev, who closely supervised the planning of the 
day, is designed not to induce people to fall in love, but to help couples to remain 
in love. (14) Celebrated in 25 regions, the inaugural “Day of Family, Love, and 
Fidelity” included a large ceremony in a southern Moscow park at which 200 
medals were awarded to couples married longer than 25 years (no small feat in a 
country with an 80% divorce rate) and the dedication of a new bench designed 
“with a back shaped like outstretched angels’ wings and a curved seat that 
encourages couples to slide closer together,” so that they might discuss their 
differences. (15) 
 
In the Krasnoyarsk region, the day was stretched into a weeklong festival 
dedicated to convincing women not to have abortions. (16) In light of the 
country’s current population woes, abortion has become a popular topic among 
politicians eager to reintroduce legislation banning the practice.  Although the 
procedure was legalized again in 1995, it has alternated in and out of legitimacy 
since Stalin first prohibited it in 1936. (17) Although the abortion rate is falling, 
current figures indicate that on average, thirteen abortions are performed for 
every ten births in Russia. (18) Those opposed to the idea of legally banning the 
practice have argued that the choice should lie with the woman, and that a ban 
will only increase the number of illegal, dangerous procedures, possibly 
sustaining or even increasing the number of deaths in the country.  They 
maintain that other methods, (including hinting that abortions may lead to sterility 
or other health concerns or appealing to prospective mothers on moral grounds) 
are just as effective in reducing the abortion rate.  Both sides agree that all 
concerned would benefit from an increased emphasis on family planning. 
 9 
 
Blogger convicted for comments in an online journal 
On the same day as couples across Russia renewed their love and celebrated 
the future, a judge’s ruling in Syktyvkar forcibly reminded onlookers that some 
things in the country continue to operate as they did in the past.  Musician Savva 
Terentiev was sentenced to twelve months in jail for the incitement of hatred and 
violation of human dignity.  State prosecutors argued that Terentiev’s comments, 
which included the recommendation that “one infidel cop per day” be burned, 
(19) were punishable under Article 282 of Russia’s Criminal Code, which covers 
what can and cannot be said through the country’s various mass media outlets –
despite the fact that the law does not specify the Internet as a form of mass 
communication.  The Internet’s wide accessibility, argued State Prosecutor Lada 
Luzan, classifies it as such.  (20) 
 
It is this classification that may have wide-reaching implications for the future of 
free speech in Russia.  Terentiev’s case is the first on record involving a journal 
entry from an online blog, but it’s one in a long line of situations in which the 
Russian government has taken exception to its citizens' right to speak freely 
online.  Most of the cases that have gone before the court system have involved 
the incitement of racial, ethnic, or religious hatred.  The July 8 ruling, however, 
was the first time that the Russian government successfully prosecuted 
someone’s personal opinions found in an online journal.  This situation is 
expected to have wide-reaching consequences because of the burgeoning 
popularity of blogging in Russia, which until now has offered an expansive public 
venue for voicing anti-establishment sentiment free from the threat of retribution.  
 
The members of Russia’s remarkably passionate online community have rushed 
to Terentiev’s defense, comparing online blogs to a kitchen table where gossip is 
passed around.  By this reasoning, they argue, the Russian people are free to 
differentiate between Terentiev’s opinion and a direct order. (21) They also cite a 
similar case in the European Union (EU) court system, where the government 
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brought suit against a blogger who called police “wild beasts in uniform and 
sadists” in Torgerson v. Iceland. (22) The EU’s Court on Human Rights found 
that these adjectives couldn’t be considered excessive, and that under Article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, which ensures every citizen’s 
right to freedom of expression, (23) Torgerson could not be prosecuted.  In 
Syktyvkar, however, the judge refused to take either of these arguments into 
account. 
 
The jury is still out on whether the Terentiev case is a one-time incident based on 
one blogger crossing the line or whether it should be seen as a warning to other 
bloggers to keep their opinions to themselves.  Either way, the judge’s decision 
indicates that many in Russia continue to oppose the idea of free and 
uncontrolled speech.  Although it’s too early to judge how this ruling will affect 
future cases, it has not lessened the resolve of some Russian officials, who have 
been attempting to introduce censorship measures under the banner of fighting 
terrorism and extremism for the past decade. The latest of such measures was 
introduced last month by the Russian Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev, who 
wishes to officially classify the Internet as a mass-media outlet in order to 
criminalize “dissemination of extremist and terrorist ideas” online.  (24) However, 
other members of the government oppose such measures on the grounds that 
extremism won’t be resolved by taking away one method of dissemination, and 
that the government must find more subtle ways to fight it.  As for the Russian 
people, a recent Perm-Online study indicated that more than 60% oppose 
measures to limit free speech on the Internet. (25) 
 
Government opposition to promoting ideologies online hasn’t stopped the 
Kremlin from attempting to use the Internet to sway public opinion in its favor.  
The Independent Consumers Association (ICA) recently announced that it had 
found that the government has begun to plant “agents of influence,” otherwise 
known as “G-Commandos” in online political forums. (26) The G-Commandos, 
distinguished by their near-constant Internet presence, strong anti-Western, pro-
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Kremlin sentiment and tendency to attack viciously anyone who appears to 
oppose the current regime, frequently change screen names and possibly are 
linked to Russia’s various security agencies.  However, like the Terentiev case, 
the presence of the G-Commandos has had one unexpected result – Internet 
users have begun to band together to fight the intruders who threaten their free 
speech and open discussions, in yet another significant example of Russia’s 
unexpectedly empowered web community. 
 
Source Notes:  
(1) Nikita Mironov, “Will Russia's population drop one-third by the mid-2000s?” 
Komsomolskaya pravda, 19 Jun 08 via http://www.kp.ru/daily/24116.3/339907/. 
Last accessed 17 Jul 08. 
(2) Mark L. Haas, “Pax Americana Geriatrica,” Miller-McCune 14 Jul 08 via 
http://www.miller-mccune.com/article/497.  Last accessed 16 Jul 08. 
(3) Sara Rhodin, “From Russia with love: A new holiday to fight population 
decline,” International Herald Tribune, 8 Jul 08 via 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/07/08/europe/russia.php.  Last accessed 16 Jul 
08. 
(4) Nabi Abdullaev, “Boosting Population a Vague Science,” The Moscow Times, 
11 Jul 08 via http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/1010/42/368867.htm. Last 
accessed 16 Jul 08. 
(5) Abdullaev, ibid. 
(6) Rhodin, ibid.   
(7) Mironov, ibid.  
(8) Yasha Levine, “Incentivized Birth: How Russia's baby-boosting policies are 
hurting the population,” Slate.com, 10 Jul 08 via 
http://www.slate.com/id/2195133/. Last accessed 16 Jul 08. 
(9) Ibid. 
(10) Haas, ibid. 
(11) Levine, ibid. 
(12) Ibid. 
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(13) Ibid. 
(14) Anna Malpas, “A New Day for Family, Love and Fidelity,” The Moscow 
Times, 8 Jul 08 via http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/600/42/368786.htm.  
Last accessed 21 Jul 08. 
(15) Tony Halpin, “Population crisis sees revival of Russian version of Valentines 
Day,” Times Online, 8 Jul 08 via 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4296778.ece.  Last 
accessed 17 Jul 08. 
(16) Ibid – Malpas. 
(17)  “Will abortion ban improve Russia's demography?” Pravda, 11 Feb 05 via 
http://english.pravda.ru/society/family/9168-abortion-0.  Last accessed 17 Jul 08. 
(18) Ibid. 
(19) “First prison sentence passed on Blogger for remarks in Live Journal,” Itar-
Tass, 8 Jul 08 via David Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), 9 Jul 08, 2008-#129. 
(20) Ibid. 
(21) “Russian rights activists condemn conviction of Blogger,” Interfax, 8 Jul 08 
via David Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), 9 Jul 08, 08-#129. 
(22) Ibid. 
(23) “European Convention on Human Rights and its five protocols,” Hellenic 
Resources Network via http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html.  Last accessed 21 
Jul 08. 
(24) “Russian Interior Minister wants to restrict Internet,” Ekho Moskvy Radio, 11 
Jul 08 via David Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), 14 Jul 08, 08-#131. 
(25) Itar-Tass, ibid. 
(26) Paul Goble, “Window on Eurasia: Kremlin’s ‘Agents of Influence’ Said Tilting 
Internet Forums against the West,” Window on Eurasia, 7 Jul 08 via David 
Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), 9 Jul 08, 08-#129.-#129. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
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ABM: Russia to react? 
Four months ago, Secretaries of State and Defense Condoleeza Rice and Robert 
Gates traveled to Moscow for talks with their counterparts. Although a number of 
issues were discussed, the primary goal was to reassure the Kremlin about, and 
to obtain its acceptance of, the proposed US anti-missile shield. In order to 
attempt to assuage Moscow's concerns, the US delegation offered Russia the 
opportunity to verify that the system "does not work against it," by allowing 
Russian officials to examine the interceptor bases in the Czech Republic and 
Poland.  
    
The Russian response to these offers was on the one hand to welcome them, 
with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claiming that they amounted to US 
recognition of Russia's concerns, but on the other hand to insist that Russia must 
have a "permanent presence" at these bases in order to be able to carry out 
"technical monitoring." In Moscow's view, one-off verification visits do not provide 
sufficient guarantees of friendly intentions. (1) During the last few weeks, there 
have been some new developments on the ABM issue that have brought 
Russian reaction.    
    
First, on July 8th, the US and the Czech Republic signed an agreement for ABM 
assets to be based on the latter's soil. President Dmitri Medvedev reacted to the 
agreement by stating that Russia would take "appropriate steps" in response to 
the development. That such a response will include "military-technical" (2) 
methods seems clear, but the question remains what precisely Russia is capable 
of doing. Possible responses could include withdrawal from the 1987 Treaty on 
Intermediate Range Missiles (INF), or the stationing of tactical missiles near 
Kaliningrad and in Belarus, (3) but the reality is that Russia's current military 
capabilities make it highly doubtful whether a direct response is feasible.  
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Secondly, on July 9th, Iran test-fired a number of missiles. In the days since the 
incident, it has emerged that the missiles used may not have been Iran's newest, 
and that photos released by Tehran likely were doctored in order to "exaggerate" 
the regime's military capabilities. (4) Russia's response to the missile tests has 
been to use the results to argue its viewpoint that Iran’s missiles have a limited 
range of only 1,240 miles (5) and are not inter-continental. Therefore, they do not 
directly threaten the United States, and the "current idea of deploying a 
US…missile shield in Europe, with its parameters, is not needed to monitor and 
react to missiles with this range." (6) The idea of the ABM system being geared 
to the future, when Iran might develop ICBM capabilities, does not seem to be in 
Moscow's thoughts.    
    
The third development is the alleged possibility that, should Poland decide 
against hosting the missile shield, Lithuania might provide an alternative. On 11 
July, the Baltic country's president, Valdas Adamuk, stated that his country would 
be open to the idea of "stationing those elements" of the shield designated for 
Poland. (7) Adamuk claimed that no talks have taken place thus far, and that he 
did not believe Lithuania to be more suitable than Poland. (8) This denial in fact 
was incorrect: According to the New York Times, State Department Security 
experts approached Lithuania some time around the middle of June, due to 
Poland’s vacillations.  (9)  
 
The “Lithuanian option” apparently has been discussed in that country's media 
for some weeks, provoking a virulent reaction from Moscow. Sergei Prikhodko, 
Medvedev's spokesman, told the press that missiles in Lithuania would be 
"absolutely unacceptable," (10) while Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak 
noted that "Lithuania is closer to Russia's territory," making the system "less 
attractive for Russia from a perspective of its possibilities of affecting our 
interests." (11) Placing US missiles in Russia's Near Abroad would be viewed 
qualitatively differently than putting them only a little farther westwards. Indeed, 
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such an action would be viewed as an “aggressive” move by the United States 
itself.  
    
Finally, a possible explanation for Russia's paranoia vis-à-vis ABM has come to 
light. On 10 July, Alexander Pikaev, head of the Disarmament and Conflict and 
Settlement Department of Russia's Science Academy, claimed that the US could 
station nuclear armed ballistic missiles at the Czech and Polish bases, under 
defensive pretexts. Without real and ongoing verification capabilities, Russia's 
military would, according to Pikaev, have to "take into consideration the worst 
scenario." (12) 
 
Given the Academy of Science's close ties to the establishment, this viewpoint 
must be regarded as official.  
    
It is possible—although no evidence exists to prove this at the time of writing—
that the talks with Lithuania were and are designed to push Russia into a 
diplomatic maximal or minimal corner: We will build our system, but you 
choose—the missiles either go to Poland, farther from your soil, or to Lithuania, 
right on your border. 
 
Russia may never accept the ABM system, because its foreign policy worldview 
sees NATO and the US as its primary opponents and targets. But it may mute its 
objections, given such a choice.     
 
Return of Kuril Islands? 
On the fringes of the G8 summit held early this month, President Dmitri 
Medvedev conducted brief bilateral talks with a number of his counterparts. 
Medvedev's meeting with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, reportedly bad 
tempered, focused on the ongoing diplomatic rows over TNK-BP and the 
Litvinenko assassination, and apparently reached no resolutions. (13) 
Discussions between the Russian President and German Chancellor Angela 
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Merkel centered almost exclusively on energy, and an agreement was reached to 
hold future in-depth talks over the purchase and sale of natural gas and oil. (14) 
The talks that apparently were the most congenial and yielded the most concrete 
results were those between Medvedev and Japanese Premier Yasuo Fukuda.  
    
The two leaders discussed a wide range of issues, reaching agreement on some, 
and confirming their intent to talk further about others. Russia and Japan are to 
sign a criminal-judicial treaty, which will allow law-enforcement officials in both 
states to open contact and "obtain cooperation" from their counterparts without 
the necessity of diplomatic involvement. The agreement was necessitated by the 
(apparently) ever-increasing cooperation between organized crime groups in 
both countries, particularly in relation to the smuggling of stolen cars between 
Russian and Japanese ports, and fisheries infringements. (15) Fukuda and 
Medvedev also agreed on environmental issues, recognizing that the two 
countries must cooperate on measures to reduce the levels of ice drift and ice 
melt in the Sea of Okhotsk. (16) The problem is exacerbated by chemical waste 
dumping, particularly into the Amur river, which feeds into the Sea of Okhotsk. 
(17)  
    
The most interesting aspect of the bilateral talks concerned the long-running 
territorial dispute between Japan and Russia over the Kuril Isles, most of which 
the Soviet Union was permitted to annex from Japan at the end of the Second 
World War. However, the four southernmost islands remain in dispute. The two 
leaders agreed that territorial issues must be resolved as soon as possible, and 
that the basis for talks on the islands is to be the joint Japanese-Soviet 
declaration of 1956, which holds the return of territory seized by the USSR 
contingent on the conclusion of a peace treaty between the two countries. (18) 
The territorial dispute seems now to have assumed a new importance, with both 
Fukuda and Medvedev acknowledging that it stands in the way of deepening ties 
between their countries. (19)  
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Most revealing is that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin will be the point-man for 
Russia on all of the aforementioned issues. Putin, together with Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov, is to travel to Japan for in-depth talks at an as-yet unspecified 
date later this year. (20) The fact that Putin will be in charge indicates the amount 
of sway he continues to hold, particularly with regard to foreign policy and 
security. 
 
 Source Notes:  
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Russian-Czech oil drawdown: A shot across the bow? 
On Friday, July 11, Czech authorities reported a precipitous drop in crude oil 
volumes flowing through the Druzhba pipeline from Russia, the county’s main 
supplier, responsible for 5.5 of 7.7 million tons of oil consumed annually by the 
Czech Republic. (1)  The Russian side provided no immediate explanation for the 
drawdown that reduced supplies to the Czech Republic by half at week’s end. (2)  
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Earlier in the week, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was in Prague to 
sign an agreement, together with her Czech counterpart Karel Schwarzenberg, to 
deploy a radar system in the Czech Republic as part of a US global missile shield 
that is fiercely opposed by Moscow. The coincidence of events was impossible to 
ignore, arousing widespread suspicion that the cut in oil supplies is intended to 
be understood as retaliation by Moscow against the Czech Republic for its failure 
to toe the Russian line on missile defense in Eastern Europe. (3) 
 
On Monday, July 14, an official at Transneft, Russia’s oil export monopoly, 
announced that the drop in oil volumes was the result of a decision by two 
Russian firms to refine more crude at home. “It is in no way linked to politics. It is 
pure commerce,” said Transneft Vice-President Mikhail Barkov. (4)  Anxious to 
avoid a showdown with Moscow, the Czech government quickly endorsed the 
innocuous explanation: “I want to believe that the reasons which the Russian 
supplier states are only technical,” said Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek, 
who added that his government “is not going to take any steps because at the 
moment there is no threat for the citizens, thanks to diversification of supplies.” 
(5) 
 
The Prime Minister is understandably reluctant to admit that a diplomatic crisis 
with Moscow is brewing at a moment when his country is moving forward with a 
plan opposed by Russia to host components of a US missile shield. His 
willingness to accept Moscow’s banal explanation for missing oil volumes must 
be regarded therefore as so much diplomatic unguent applied to a gash in 
Russian-Czech relations. Unconstrained by such imperatives of office, however, 
precedents should be acknowledged for Russia’s punitive drawdown in energy 
supplies to neighboring countries where government policies have run counter to 
Moscow’s strategic concepts. 
 
Ukraine has seen natural gas supplies cut on two occasions as a result of pricing 
disputes that flared up after the Ukrainian government challenged Russia’s 
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monopolistic export policies: In January 2006, the Ukrainian government refused 
to turn over its national pipeline grid to Russia’s Gazprom. In retaliation, 
Gazprom opted to raise its prices by 460%, from $50 up to $230 per 1,000 cubic 
meters of gas. (6)  When Ukraine balked at the sharp increase, Gazprom shut off 
the country’s gas supply. In March 2008, Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia 
Tymoshenko fought to cut intermediary companies out of the natural gas supply 
chain. Her attack against the thoroughly corrupt intermediaries met with 
resistance from Gazprom, which used its 50% ownership in the enterprises as a 
channel to control gas deliveries on the Ukrainian domestic market. The dispute 
escalated when Tymoshenko refused to accept an energy bill totaling $1.5 billion 
presented by Gazprom, laying blame for the debt on the intermediaries instead. 
 
Georgia suffered a loss of gas supplies in January 2006, when explosions in 
Southern Russia severed the country’s gas pipelines. Although the Russian 
government rejected his allegations, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili had 
no doubts about Moscow’s complicity in the blasts. “The places where it 
happened, the environment in which it happened, the history in which it 
happened - this all looks like a policy decision,” said Saakashvili, who noted that 
the sabotage followed upon veiled threats by Russian officials after Georgia 
refused to sell its gas pipeline network to Gazprom. (7) 
 
Some observers point to Russia’s shutoff of deliveries of crude oil to Belarus in 
January 2007 as evidence that economic factors outweigh political 
considerations to form the guiding principle of Moscow’s energy export practices. 
Such an assessment overestimates the degree of mutual sympathy binding the 
two countries at the time the trade war erupted. Moscow had grown impatient 
with the galloping corruption across its border, an untenable situation that 
jeopardized the security of Russian crude supplies bound for European markets. 
Moreover, when Moscow threatened to institute stiff price hikes for its oil and gas 
supplies to Belarus, the government in Minsk slapped tariffs on Russian crude 
supplies transported across Belarusian territory. Such an affront to its authority 
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made Moscow bring both political and economic retaliation to bear on a 
contumacious client state: a drop in energy supplies flowing from Russia is a 
bright red flag.  Explanations based solely on economics do little to mitigate the 
impression created by the emerging pattern of red flags.  
             
The Czech Republic expects to ride out the current crude shortage by tapping 
into a three month supply of national reserves and raising deliveries from a West 
European pipeline system. (8) Tomas Bartovsky, spokesman for the Czech 
Ministry of Industry and Trade, remarked that if Russia had intended to threaten 
the country, it would have cut the flow of natural gas instead of oil, as gas supply 
sources are less diversified. His comment was a significant admission of the 
fragility of his state’s position vis-à-vis Russia, and an inadvertent suggestion that 
the current drawdown could be interpreted as a warning of trouble in the future. A 
statement issued by the Russian Foreign Ministry in response to the Prague 
missile defense agreement echoed that menace by threatening to “react, not 
through diplomatic means, but with military and technical methods.” (9)  If the 
specter of a Russian military strike against Eastern Europe seems dim, a 
targeted shutoff of Russian energy supplies is a perfectly conceivable “technical 
method,” already being deployed by Moscow. 
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(1) “Czech ministry says oil supply problem unrelated to dispute with Russia,” 
International Herald Tribune, 14 Jul 08 via 
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/07/14/europe/EU-Czech-Russia-Oil.php. 
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(5) Ibid. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Robyn Angley 
 
GEORGIA 
A little bit louder and a little bit worse  
Tbilisi, Sukhumi and Moscow have witnessed a veritable parade of Western 
dignitaries over the last several months as American and European officials seek 
to defuse the tension sparked by the recognition of Kosovo (and the precedent it 
set), as well as Russia’s declaration of its intent to forge a closer relationship—
perhaps akin to that between the US and Taiwan—with Abkhazia, one of 
Georgia’s separatist republics. The situation has caused a stir in the West, with a 
variety of notables, among them US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, 
making their way to the Caucasus in search of a solution. 
 
The recognition of Kosovo by western governments has produced increased 
Russian involvement in the separatist regions, including the deployment of an 
assortment of paratroopers and railway troops to Abkhazia. According to recent 
announcements from the Russian Defense Ministry, the railway troops, at least, 
are scheduled to be withdrawn “in the near future,” having completed their work 
on a segment of railway connecting Sukhumi and Ochamchire.  (1) 
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A 27 June article in the Russian newspaper Kommersant reported that Georgian 
officials had offered to partition Abkhazia into zones of influence, while retaining 
the republic under de jure Georgian rule. (2)  The report was refuted vigorously 
by both Georgian and Russian authorities. 
 
More recently, in early July, Russia sent fighter jets flying over South Ossetia as 
a warning “to cool hot heads in Tbilisi.” (3)  As that incident reemphasizes, 
Abkhazia is not the only separatist regime with which Tbilisi must negotiate. A 
series of hostage takings in South Ossetia—by both sides—is an indicator of 
increased tensions between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali. In response to the fly-over, 
Georgia recalled its ambassador to Russia, Erosi Kitsmarishvili. Kitsmarishvili is 
the former owner of the Rustavi-2 television station, which played a significant 
and sometimes provocative role in then-opposition leader Mikheil Saakashvili’s 
protest campaign against former president Eduard Shevardnadze. The violation 
of Georgian airspace became the subject of intense debate at the UN Security 
Council on 22 July. 
 
In light of the increased security threat, Georgia’s parliament has voted to 
increase the size of the Georgian army by 5,000 troops. Additionally, large-scale 
military exercises have taken place both in Russia and in Georgia. One such 
exercise took place in Georgia under the auspices of the NATO Partnership for 
Peace Program. It involved 1,650 troops and included American, Georgian, 
Armenian, Ukrainian, and Azerbaijani forces. A second exercise, much larger in 
scale, was held across the Russian North Caucasus region, including Chechnya, 
North Ossetia, and Ingushetia, and mustered around 8,000 troops, in addition to 
numerous combat vehicles and aircraft. (4)  The stated purpose of the Russian 
exercise was to increase the “interoperability” of its multiple service branches. 
 
A German sponsored peace plan for Abkhazia, put forth in mid-July, was rejected 
by Sukhumi, although, surprisingly, it subsequently received positive feedback 
from Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. The German plan was presented 
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to the relevant parties by Berlin’s Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier at a 
time when tensions between Georgia and Russia, as well as between Tbilisi and 
its separatist republics, are at their highest point in years. The plan envisioned 
three stages to a Georgian-Abkhaz peace process. The first phase would consist 
of confidence-building measures, including an agreement on the non-use of force 
and the return of Georgian refugees to Abkhazia. The second phase called for 
reconstruction projects in Abkhazia, funded by donor countries. The third and 
presumably most challenging phase would be the resolution Abkhazia’s status. 
Both Russian and Abkhazian officials have objected strongly to the linkage of a 
non-use of force agreement with the issue of return of refugees, while Georgia 
refuses to sign such an agreement without that proviso. Additionally, Abkhaz and 
Russian representatives have called for the removal of Georgian forces from the 
upper Kodori Gorge as a precursor to negotiations. 
 
That Russia and Georgia should be at odds with one another is nothing new. 
Neither is Sukhumi’s continued resistance to Georgia’s repeated attempts to 
resolve Abkhazia’s status in a way that includes the republic as part of Georgia. 
However, Germany’s increased involvement could be an indication that Europe 
may take a more active role in negotiations that up to now have been devoid of 
substantive European participation. 
 
ARMENIA 
Turkish-Armenian talks and World Cup diplomacy 
Turkey and Armenia’s acrimonious (and diplomatically non-existent) relationship 
may be taking a turn for the better if recent developments are any indication. 
Armenian president Serzh Sarkisian has invited Turkish president Abdullah Gul 
to join him in Yerevan on 6 September to watch the two countries’ teams contest 
a World Cup qualifying match. Following Sarkisian’s invitation, officials from both 
countries met in Bern, Switzerland, for talks, the details of which have not been 
publicized. 
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It is too early yet to say what the outcome of these overtures may be or how they 
may affect the outstanding issues in the Turkish-Armenian relationship. There 
are several major points of contention between the two neighbors. The closed 
border between Turkey and Armenia—Ankara’s response to Yerevan’s conflict 
with Turkish ally, Azerbaijan, over Nagorno-Karabakh—is a major impediment to 
Armenia’s economic growth. Another significant issue is Armenia’s call for a 
Turkish acknowledgement that the mass slaughter of Armenians that took place 
in the waning days of the Ottoman Empire was genocide. Several of Armenia’s 
political parties have made Turkish recognition of the genocide a central part of 
their platforms. These domestic constituencies have made it difficult for Armenian 
officials to negotiate with their Turkish counterparts without preconditions, despite 
repeated statements of their willingness to do so.  However, perhaps Sarkisian 
will be able to muster enough political clout to move the discussion along.   
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KYRGYZSTAN 
Kyrgyz water shortages produce sparks, but little power  
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While on a recent trip to inspect and laud the efficiency and successful 
privatization of one of Kyrgyzstan’s small hydroelectric power stations, perhaps 
as part of a propaganda campaign to sell the country’s business elite on the 
general concept of privatizing the country’s hydropower industry, President 
Kurmanbek Bakiev felt compelled to temper his praise with a rather blunt warning 
of future energy shortages: “…I do not guarantee that electricity will be enough to 
supply everybody. It is necessary to begin making preparations right now. If 
someone thinks that the winter will be the same as last year, one will be 
mistaken. This winter will be very difficult. There will be electricity cuts.”  The 
president urged that not only residents, but schools find alternatives to electric 
power, recommending that they turn to coal as a heating source. (1) 
 
Bakiev’s comments echoed an announcement made the previous day by the 
Ministry of Industry, Energy and Fuel Resources, informing the public that due to 
inadequate water supplies in the Toktogul Reservoir, which generates 40% of 
Kyrgyzstan’s electricity, there would be power cuts to private residences, 
schools, and hospitals.  The ministry suggested that people buy coal and/or 
mazut (heavy, low quality fuel oil) in order to heat their homes once the cold 
weather sets in.  In an effort to conserve energy, the ministry will shut off 
electricity supplies to residential heaters on August 1, (2) perhaps hoping to 
avoid power reductions to the country’s businesses and industries, like those 
which plagued Tajikistan last winter.  Electricity rates also will be raised by 10-
12%. (3) 
 
Kyrgyzstan, much like Tajikistan, is heavily dependent on its hydropower industry 
for electrical power, and low water levels in the rivers which supply the Toktogul 
Reservoir indicate that the coming winter will see widespread power shortages.  
The reservoir requires at least 12 billion cubic meters of water in order to produce 
enough electricity to meet the country’s demands, but is currently 3-4 billion cubic 
meters short, due to an inordinately high demand for power last winter.  The 
Kyrgyz hydropower industry further is plagued by aging, inefficient infrastructure 
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and equipment, theft, and the government’s inability to attract foreign investment 
in its energy sector. (4)  The Bakiev administration’s latest efforts have been to 
attract sufficient financial backing to finish building the Kambar-Ata-1 and 
Kambar-Ata-2 hydroelectric power stations (located on the Naryn River) whose 
construction has been in limbo since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Last 
March, it seemed that this goal finally had been achieved, when First Deputy 
Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov announced that Kazakhstan and Russia had 
agreed to form a joint venture (with a 33% share apiece and 34% for Kyrgyzstan) 
to complete the Kambar-Ata projects.  (5) However, one of the conditions 
required for the projects to move forward was the privatization of hydropower 
stations, as well as heating and power plants in Bishkek and Osh, including the 
Kambar-Ata plants; unfortunately, when the privatization bill came up for a vote 
by the Kyrgyz parliament last June, it failed, (6) and President Bakiev and his 
deputies have since been engaged in trying to negotiate a new deal with Russia. 
 
Following his recent visit to Moscow to meet with President Medvedev and Prime 
Minister Putin, Bakiev claimed that Russia once again is considering investing in 
his country’s hydropower industry.  Medvedev and Putin agreed to send a 
“working group” to Kyrgyzstan in the near future for the purpose of studying ways 
in which Russia can invest in the Kyrgyz economy; Bakiev apparently chose to 
interpret this gesture as a Russian commitment to finance the Kambar-Ata 
projects. (7) 
 
In addition, the Kyrgyz government still seems to hold out hope that it will be able 
to attract Iranian investment in the projects; a few days before Bakiev’s journey to 
Moscow, Prime Minister Igor Chudinov met with Bahman Ayar-Reza'i, the 
managing director of the Bandar-Abbas Persian Gulf Zone for Mineral and Metal 
Industries (subordinate to the Iranian Ministry of Industries and Mines), and 
suggested that should Iran decide to finance hydroelectric power stations in 
Kyrgyzstan, such as the Kambar-Ata stations, electricity supplies would be 
sufficient to allow export to Iran.  Chudinov also invited Iranian companies to 
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invest in the construction of a China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway line, (8) but 
so far, Iran has not made financial commitments to any of these ventures. 
 
In spite of the president’s and the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Fuel 
Resources’ warnings of power shortages in the fall, Kyrgyzstan began exporting 
a small amount of power (500m kWh total) to Kazakhstan on July 14 and will 
continue to do so until the end of August.  Exporting even such a small amount of 
electricity is necessary because it is the revenue from these exports which 
makes it possible for the Bishkek Thermal Power Plant to buy fuel. (9)  
Unfortunately, Kyrgyz electricity exports to Kazakhstan set off sparks between 
the Kazakh and Uzbek governments last week, when Kazakhstan did not receive 
adequate water supplies from the Dostyk channel (which runs from Uzbekistan to 
Kazakhstan via Kyrgyzstan) to meet its irrigation needs.  Kazakh Vice Prime 
Minister Umirzak Shukeev fired off a telegram to Uzbek Vice Prime Minister 
Rustam Asimov demanding that the Uzbek government restore water levels in its 
section of the Dostyk channel and threatening to cease buying Kyrgyz electricity, 
which is used to pump the water into the South Kazakh oblast’s cotton fields. (10)  
This situation is illustrative of a much larger and potentially disastrous dilemma 
confronting the Central Asian states: do they allocate more water for hydropower 
generation or for crop irrigation and can one exist without the other?  The Syr-
Darya River is the only water source which can meet both of these goals (11) 
and it seems that there is no longer enough to go around. 
 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are facing severe energy shortages, due to water 
shortfalls, for the upcoming heating season and the entire region will suffer food 
shortages, should water levels continue to drop, due to lack of rainfall and the 
inequitable distribution of water resources.  Last winter saw grain shortages 
throughout most of Central Asia and the cost of food in general has risen 
dramatically.  Food prices combined with increasing energy rates have prompted 
a more than 15% rise in Kyrgyzstan’s inflation rate, according to Economic 
Development and Trade Minister Akylbek Japarov. (12)  Prime Minister 
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Chudinov, on the other hand, has blamed the rise in prices on groups of semi-
criminal “middlemen,” who use the agricultural market to launder funds gained 
through their illegal enterprises and, as a result, artificially inflate the price of 
agricultural products. (13)  There is little doubt that the activities of organized 
crime groups victimize the average consumer, not only in Kyrgyzstan, but 
throughout Central Asia and that these groups contribute to much of the 
corruption found in the region, however, the crime groups are only half of the 
equation – the corrupt government and law enforcement officials who permit the 
crime groups to function make up the other half.  Unless Chudinov launches a 
wholesale anti-corruption drive, it seems unlikely that these crime groups’ 
activities will cease and that any economic benefits will flow to the average 
consumer. 
 
Shifting blame for the dire situation with food and energy prices and supplies 
from the government to (as yet unspecified) criminal groups may benefit 
Chudinov politically, but it may not be sufficient to assuage the average Kyrgyz 
citizen this winter, when his family is sitting in the cold and dark, trying to scrape 
enough som (Kyrgyz currency) together to afford at least one daily meal.  
Conflicts over water use undoubtedly will continue and unless this year’s grain 
harvest is vastly larger than last year’s (which seems unlikely, given, locust 
infestations, the lack of rain, and other problems), the Kyrgyz government may 
find itself unable to meet its citizens’ most basic needs – food and adequate 
(heated) shelter. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Kyrgyz President Warns Of Fuel Shortage, Winter Power Cuts,” 15 Jul 08, 
Kyrgyz Television 1; BBC Worldwide Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(2) “Kyrgyzstan: People to Pay for Energy Crisis,” 14 Jul 08, Central Asia news, 
Ferghana.Ru via 
http://enews.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=2418&PHPSESSID=be1b21f9220577cc8
2faa, accessed 22 Jul 08. 
 30 
(3) Natalia Leshchenko, “Water and Energy Crisis Fuels Kazakh-Uzbek Dispute, 
Kyrgyzstan Prepares for Energy Shortages,” 21 Jul 08, Global Insight; World 
Markets Research Limited via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(4) “Kyrgyzstan: People to Pay for Energy Crisis,” 14 Jul 08, Ferghana.Ru, ibid. 
(5) “Kazakhstan, Russia To Build Hydroelectric Power Stations In Kyrgyzstan,” 
15 Mar 07, AKIpress; BBC Worldwide Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(6) “Parliament rejects Kambarata privatization bill,” 20 Jun 07, The Times of 
Central Asia via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(7) “Kyrgyz, Russian Leaders Reach Accord On Writing Off Kyrgyz Debt – 
President,” 17 Jul 08, Kyrgyz Television 1; BBC Worldwide Monitoring via Lexis-
Nexis Academic. 
(8) “Kyrgyz Premier, Iranian Official Discuss Economic Cooperation,” 14 Jul 08, 
Kabar; BBC Worldwide Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(9) “Kyrgyzstan Starts Exporting Electricity To Kazakhstan,” 15 Jul 08, 
Kazakhstan Today news agency website; BBC Worldwide Monitoring via Lexis-
Nexis Academic. 
(10) “Uzbekistan turns off water to Kazakhstan,” 21 July 08, Central Asian News 
Service-Kazakhstan via http://en.ca-news.org/news/10644, accessed 24 Jul 08. 
(11) Merhat Sharipzhan, “In Central Asia, Water Could Lead To Fire,” 23 Jul 08, 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty via 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Commentary_Water_Crisis_Central_Asia/1185586.ht
ml, accessed 24 Jul 08. 
(12) Victoria Svetlichnaya, “Kyrgyz inflation higher than expected,” 17 Jul 08, The 
Times of Central Asia via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(13) “Kyrgyz prime minister blames middlemen for price rises,” 22 Jul 08, 
AKIpress; BBC Worldwide Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
 31 
UKRAINE 
Exploring Ukraine’s Vanco dispute 
The Western business community in Ukraine still is reeling over the 
government’s decision to annul a major deep-water oil and gas exploration 
contract involving a US-based company.  “How will companies sign contracts if 
they are canceled at a press conference, without negotiations to find out whether 
the company is willing to make changes before all this is aired as part of 
campaign speeches?” asked Morgan Williams, president of the US-Ukraine 
Business Council.  (1) 
 
To be sure, it is understandable why the unilateral canceling of a contract without 
benefit of court or mediation decision would send shockwaves through potential 
investors, and the government must begin to understand that this type of remedy 
is not supported in Western circles. Nevertheless, while the government handled 
the situation badly, it does appear to have had grounds for concern.  The issue 
appears far more complex than originally thought. 
 
The contract with an affiliate of Vanco International Ltd. - a subsidiary of 
Houston’s Vanco Energy Company – was “revoked and terminated” on 21 May.  
The Production Sharing Agreement had a 30-year span and reportedly could 
have involved up to 15 billion dollars in investment to complete the surveying, 
prospecting and possibly extracting of oil and gas on Ukraine’s Black Sea shelf.  
Most experts suggest that the area at issue – the Prykerchenska region of the 
shelf – contains enough gas to provide the country with 25 percent of its 
domestic needs per year.  
 
The depth of the gas, however, is extremely problematic, and the size of the area 
is unusually large at 13,000 square kilometers.  Therefore, the government 
issued a highly specialized request for proposals in late 2005 to conduct the 
exploration work.  
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On 19 April 2006, Vanco International Ltd won the tender to develop the 
Prykerchenska area.  The bid, submitted jointly with UK-based JNR Eastern 
Investments, beat out, among others, a joint bid by Shell and Exxon Mobil.  
 
Jim Bown, Vanco’s representative in Ukraine, told journalists at the time that the 
Vanco-JNR bid was a 50/50 partnership, with Vanco providing the technical 
expertise and JNR “the financial dimension.”  Vanco International, registered in 
Bermuda, but reportedly based in Switzerland, suggested it would spend around 
$330 million over eight years to explore the field.   Any financial guarantees 
associated with the winning bid presumably would be the responsibility of JNR, 
based on Bown’s comments at the time. (2) 
 
The details of the Production Sharing Agreement were negotiated for 18 months, 
with much of the time reportedly spent waiting for the government’s responses to 
Vanco’s proposals.  
 
Finally, the contract was signed in fall 2007.  But while the Production Sharing 
Agreement (PSA) reportedly was signed between Ukraine and Vanco 
International Ltd., all licenses for subsoil exploration were awarded to an entity 
known as Vanco Prykerchenska.  This company, according to the government, 
was said to have been registered on 18 October 2007, just one day prior to the 
signing of the PSA.  (3) 
 
(As we go to press, the government suggested that the contract actually was not 
signed by Vanco International, but by Vanco Prykerchenska Ltd.  This claim is 
unconfirmed, as the document is unavailable, and a source associated with 
Vanco Energy denies this statement.  However, Vanco Prykerchenska is the 
entity requesting arbitration for failure to fulfill a contract, suggesting that it may 
be the actual party to the contract at this point.) 
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President Viktor Yushchenko signed the PSA in a public ceremony on 19 
October 2007, announcing on his website that he would hold an event “to sign a 
production sharing agreement to explore the Prykerchenska area of the Black 
Sea shelf between Ukraine and Vanco Energy Company.” (4)  The deal, he said, 
“is a strategic project for Ukraine and this is a unique precedent for, on the one 
hand, formulating a national energy strategy and, on the other hand, for 
cooperating with the world’s leading international investors.” (5) 
 
The agreement was signed, perhaps not coincidentally, almost directly following 
a snap parliamentary election that led to a change in government from then-
Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych to current-Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.  
The ceremony occurred as the new parliamentary majority coalition was being 
formed. 
 
In explaining his ministry’s decision to revoke licenses for subsoil use, 
Environmental Protection Minister Heorhiy Filipchuk suggested that Vanco 
International was not granted the right in the PSA to transfer rights of subsoil use 
to its affiliate.  (6) 
 
Moreover, both Filipchuk and Tymoshenko complained that Vanco International 
did not provide the required information about its affiliate.  On 21 May, Filipchuk 
said, “We still have not received confirmation of financial, technological or 
technical documentation from this company [Vanco Prykerchenska].”  (7) 
 
Gene Van Dyke, the President of Vanco Energy Company and Board Chair of 
VPL, vigorously denies the government’s charges.  “According to the Production 
Sharing Agreement,” he said, “Vanco International Ltd., winner of the tender, has 
the right to pass further execution of the agreement to a company founded with 
this purpose – for example, Vanco Prykerchenska Ltd.”  (8)  Van Dyke also 
suggested that the government had all necessary information on the 
Prykerchenska affiliate.  Moreover, in an interview this week, a Vanco 
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representative, who asked that his name be withheld, noted that the company 
often works through consortiums and profit-sharing agreements.  
 
VPL has called on the Ukrainian government to allow the publication of the PSA 
(also known as the Hydrocarbons Sharing Agreement), which it says has been 
misrepresented and quoted out of context for the purpose of misleading the 
public.  (9) 
 
Tymoshenko is standing her ground, however, suggesting that the deal with 
Vanco International and VPL was “a corrupt agreement concluded by the 
previous government.”  The government “has put a stake in the ground on this 
issue,” she said, and expressed confidence in “a very strong case.”  (10) 
 
Her primary contention appears to be that the VPL ownership includes a 
company closely linked both to former Prime Minister Yanukovych, who suddenly 
approved the deal before leaving office, and the current Secretary of the National 
Security and Defense Council, who has taken the lead in defending the 
agreement.  
 
Vanco Prykerchenska confirmed in May that it is not owned wholly by Vanco 
International, as assumed by many.  Instead, its ownership is split “in parity” 
among four entities:  Vanco International, the Donetsk Fuel and Energy 
Company (DTEK), Integrum Technologies of Austria, and Shadowlight 
Investments Ltd., linked to Russian businessman Yevgeny Novitsky.  (11) 
 
It is the inclusion of DTEK that reportedly got the government’s attention.  DTEK 
is the corporation linked to System’s Capital Management, which is owned by 
Ukraine’s richest billionaire Rinat Akhmetov.  In addition to his business interests, 
Akhmetov serves as a parliamentary deputy and is allegedly the chief financier of 
former Prime Minister Yanukovych’s Party of Regions.  Akhmetov is also a close 
ally of Raisa Bohateryova, now the head of President’s Yushchenko’s National 
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Security and Defense Council.  Bohateryova serves on the Party of Regions 
Political Council and was one of the leaders of the Party’s parliamentary faction 
during Yanukovych’s premiership.   
 
Neither DTEK nor any of Vanco International’s current partners in Ukraine were 
involved in the original bid proposal.  At the same time, JNR Eastern 
Investments, Vanco’s original financial partner, is no longer involved with the 
project.  
 
While DTEK’s connections are clear, Integrum Technologies is unknown.  Its 
ownership has not been disclosed by anyone involved in the project, and the 
government claims to be unable to find its backers.  
 
An email request from this author to Vanco Prykerchenska asking for contact 
information for Integrum Technologies received no response.  The Austrian 
company appears to have no website, or at least none that appears on any 
general search engine.  
 
Hans Stege of the Kremlin, Inc. Blog, has been one of the most aggressive 
pursuers of information about Integrum.  Since May, he has spent considerable 
time calling and emailing Austrian, Ukrainian and Russian companies attempting 
to locate contact information for Integrum Technologies, but to no avail.  (12) 
 
The shadowy nature of the company has allowed Ukraine’s government to 
speculate about its ownership – suggesting everything from Gazprom to 
companies related to the presidential secretariat.  None of this speculation is 
based on any available information and certainly cannot be proven.  
 
The Vanco Energy Company website is no help; the site makes no mention of 
Vanco Prykerchenska or its owners.  In fact, the site has little information about 
its Ukraine work.  The company is highly respected for its deep water exploration 
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in several African countries, and openly lists its partners in these countries on its 
website.   It makes no mention of any partners in its description of its work in 
Ukraine.  (13) 
 
An archived page located through a Google search (and not available when 
entering the site through its main page), however, shows what appears to be a 
graphic of a power point presentation slide.  The slide – titled “Legal Structure” -- 
provides an overview of the Vanco Energy Company through the use of a flow 
chart.  
 
“Vanco Energy Company is an integrated independent oil and gas company 
which operates its exploration and production activities through its wholly owned 
overseas subsidiary, Vanco International Ltd. and through the wholly owned 
subsidiaries of Vanco International Ltd.,” the slide explains.  “Vanco's integrated 
corporate structure is consistent with generally accepted practices of the 
international petroleum industry.” (14) 
 
The graphic flow chart appears to show a company called “Vanco Ukraine Ltd. 
(Bermuda)” as a subsidiary of “Vanco International Ltd. (Bermuda).”  The slide is 
dated April 2006.  (15) 
 
Vanco International’s bid proposal to Ukraine was submitted in April 2006.   
 
Despite these questions, like many Western investors, the US Ambassador to 
Ukraine expressed regret over Ukraine’s decision.  “I am very disappointed that 
the Cabinet of Ministers today took unilateral action to revoke the Production 
Sharing Agreement [that] the Government of Ukraine negotiated with U.S. 
company Vanco,” Ambassador William Taylor said in a statement.  “For the 
government of Ukraine to attract investors,” he continued, “particularly in those 
sectors vital to its energy security, it needs to make clear that it respects the 
sanctity of contracts and the rule of law.”  (16) 
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This is, of course, very true.  The manner in which the Tymoshenko government 
annulled its agreement with Vanco International is questionable.  The case not 
only demonstrates the continuing opaque nature of government agreements, but 
also underscores the utter failure of the country’s judicial system to mediate 
conflict.  The country long has been criticized for a culture of corruption – judges 
routinely are accused of accepting bribes or backing down in the face of severe 
intimidation, while prosecutors often are dependent on political favors for their 
positions.  As a result, power plays and public relations often are substituted for 
legal remedies, as even political leaders have little trust in the judicial system.  
 
Following the government’s announcement, President Yushchenko responded by 
requesting that the country’s prosecutor-general intervene.  Without benefit of 
investigation or court ruling, the prosecutor immediately issued an order to the 
government to revoke its decision.  Because Tymoshenko apparently views the 
prosecutor as a vessel of the president (with some reason), she simply ignored 
the order.   
 
On 4 June, Yushchenko issued a decree ordering the government to rescind its 
decision.  Tymoshenko ignored that decree, too, noting that it had come based 
on a recommendation of Bohateryova’s National Security and Defense Council.  
Yushchenko also created an interdepartmental commission to investigate the 
situation, and placed Bohateryova—Rinat Akhmetov’s ally—in charge of it.  (17) 
 
The Vanco case highlights many of the most urgent problems facing Ukraine.  
Continued reliance on administrative methods to remedy questionable 
contracts—to say nothing of the fact that so many questionable contracts exist—
should cause serious concern for corporations looking to work in the country.  
Close relationships between political leaders and businesses involved in major 
contracts also undoubtedly do not send the appropriate signals. 
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Furthermore, the ease with which Western corporations may become 
(sometimes unwittingly) enmeshed in the country’s muddy business environment 
is unsettling.   Corporations attempting to conduct normal business often find 
themselves held hostage to political turf battles and politically-oriented business 
interests.  
 
As the government works to clean up its business dealings, it must also 
understand the need to reform the judicial and prosecutorial mechanisms that 
should protect both private investors and the government.  If nothing else, this 
should be the message of the Vanco dispute. 
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